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NOTES.
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF TAXATION OF REALIZED CAPITAL
INCREASE UNDER FEDERAL INCOME TAX AcTs.-Justice Holmes,
dissenting in Eisner v. Macomber,' thought that the Sixteenth

Amendment had effectually laid to rest all nice questions as to

what constitute "incomes," as the word is therein used. And
Justice Pitney, speaking for the majority in a lengthy expositive
discussion of that word, no doubt thought that he was accomplish-

ing that which Justice Holmes believed had already been done.

The decision seems rather to have opened the flood-gate of juristic
logomachy, as evidenced by four recently decided cases2 in the
I2 The so-called Stock Dividend Case, 252 U. S. 189 (1920).

Brewster v. Walsh, U. S. D. C., Conn., Dec. 16, 1920, 268 Fed. 207;
Merchants' Loan and Trust Co. v. Smietanka, and Eldorado Coal and Mining
Co. v. Mager, U. S. D. C., No. Ill., East. Div., Oct. 22, 1920; Goodrich v. Edwards, U. S. D. C., So. N. Y., Dec. 17, 1920.
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United States District Courts, wherein the question has been
raised as to whether taxes assessed under the Federal Income Tax
Law of 19163 are taxes on income, or on capital. Of these, Brewster v. Walsh is the most interesting, as- the holding (that the increase in the value of capital assets, when realized by sale, by one
not a trader or dealer therein, is not income, and hence not taxable
as such) is accompanied by a carefully prepared opinion.
In Brewster v. Walsh the plaintiff sought recovery of a sum
of money paid under protest as income tax for the year 1916. The
tax in question was assessed on the difference between the market
value of certain bonds which the plaintiff owned on March i,
1913,' and the amount realized by their sale in 1916., He was not
a dealer in stocks or bonds, but occasionally bought such securities
for investment purposes, and at times sold his holdings to alter the
character of his investment. The plaintiff's contention, that the
act was unconstitutional in so far as it taxed as income the gains
or profits realized from such transactions, prevailed. The court
apparently failed to appreciate the breadth of the question involved, for having decided that the plaintiff's profit from the sale
of the bonds was not "income" within the meaning of the Sixteenth Amendment, they proceeded to the non sequitur that the
tax was on capital, hence direct, and void because not apportioned
in accordance with other provisions of the Constitution.5 If a
tax on income within the meaning of the Constitution, it is
merely relieved from apportionment "from a consideration of the
source whence the income was derived. "6 But it does not follow
that, failing to be such, it is unconstitutional, since the act, after
providing in general language for a tax "upon the entire net income received in the preceding year," 7 goes on, with such specificity as to leave no doubt as to the legislative intent, s to lay a tax
upon such a gain or profit as was derived by the plaintiff from the
sale of his bonds. 9 If not a tax on income, it may yet be an in3 Ch. 463, 39 Stat. 756.
' Date, fixed by the act, from which gains and losses on property owned
prior thereto, and subsequently sold, are to be computed. Sec. 2 (c), 39 Stat.
758; Sec. .5 (a), 39 Stat. 759. The same date is retained in the Act of x918.
Ch. i8, 40 Stat. 1057.
6Art. I, Sec. 2, Par. 3; Art. I, Sec. 9, Par. 4.
6 Brushaber v. Union Pacific R. Co., 240 U. S. i, i8 (1916); Stanton v.
Baltic 7Mining Co., 240 U. S.103, 112 (i916).
Sec. i (a), 39 Stat., 756.
8 The title of the act, "Income Tax Act," may be considered as a guide
to the intention of Congress where the body is expressed in ambiguous or doubtful language. Black, Interpretation of Laws, 2nd Ed., Sec. 83. But the title
cannot overcome unequivocal provisions. Caminetti v. United States, 242
U. S. 470 (I916).

9"That, subject only to such exemptions and deductions as are hereinafter allowed, the net income of a taxable person shall include gains, profits and
income derived from salaries, wages, or compensation for personal services
of whatever kind and in whatever form paid, or from professions, vocations,
businesses, trade, commerce, or sales, or dealings in property, whether real or
personal, growing out of the ownership or use of or interest in real or personal
property, also from interest, rent, dividends, securities, or the transaction of
any business carried on for gain or profit, or gains or profits and income derived
from any source whatever ........
Sec. 2 (a) 39 Stat. 757.
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direct tax, a duty or an excise, 10 and as such subject only to the
rule of geographical uniformity., Thus the decision in Brewster
v. Walsh brings us into the vexatious field of definitive discussion.
Is such a tax as was there questioned a tax on income within the
meaning of the Sixteenth Amendment? 2 If not, is it a direct or
indirect tax?
The principal case is *decided squarely on the authority of
Gray v. Darlington,13 which arose under the Income Tax Act of
1867,14 which laid a tax "upon the gains, profits, and income for
the year ending the 3Ist of December." On facts similar to those
in Brewster v. Walsh, the court held that the advance in the value
of bonds, during a period of four years, over their cost, realized by
their sale, was not subject to taxation as gains, profits or income
for the year in which the bonds were sold. Having disposed of
the case on purely statutory grounds, Justice Field then says by
way of dictum, at page 66: "The mere fact that property has
advanced in value between the date of its acquisition and sale
does not authorize the imposition of the tax on the amount of the
advance. Mere advance in value in no sense constitutes the gains,
profits and income specified by the statute. It constitutes and
In a late case,
*can be merely treated as increase of capital."
Lynch v. Turrish, 5 this dictum is stripped of any allusion to statute, cited with approval and stated to be part of the holding in
Gray v. Darlington.
The decision in Brewster v. Walsh is supported by the reasoning that the meaning of the word "incomes" in the Sixteenth
Amendment is no broader than its meaning under the Act of 1867,
since it was adopted with the presumptive knowledge as to how the
courts, State and Federal, defined income; and Congress cannot,
by definition in a statute, alter the scope of a constitutional provision. From the latter proposition, no one dissents; but it is
difficult to see how the former can be reconciled with the definition
20The Constitution recognizes but two classes of taxes, direct taxes and
duties, imposts and excises. Pollock v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co., 157
U. S.

429, 557

(1895).

1Art. I, Sec. 8, Par. I. Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U. S. 41 (1900).
1Walter Strachan, Capital and Income Under the Income Tax Acts,

29 L. Q. Rev. 163, suggests that it is a question of fact whether the detached

increase of a capital investment shall be regarded as capital or income. Thus,
he says, a lawyer who sold investment stocks at a profit would not regard his

gain as income; Aliter, in the case of a stock broker. Such a test may be highly
proper in the application of a statute; hardly so, in the application of a consti-

tutional provision.
"I5 Wall. 63 (1872).
is 14 Stat. 477-8.

Th247 U. S. 221 (1918), Held, that an extraordinary cash dividend in liquidation of the entire assets and business of a corporation was not income "arising
or accruing" during the year in which it was received, when the stock had reached
its peak prior to March I, 1913, the effective date of the Income Tax Act of 1913,
38 Stat. I66. The Acts of 1916 and 1918 look to the receipt, rather than to the

arisal or accrual of gains, profits and income.
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of "income" in Eisner v. Macomber, supra, in spite of the statement in Lynch v. Turrish, supra. Defining income, Justice Pitney said in Eisner v. Macomber: "We find little to add to the
succinct definition adopted in two cases arising under the Corporation Tax Act of i909 (Stratton's Independence v. Howbert,
231 U. S. 399, 415; Doyle v. Mitchell Bros. Co., 247 U. S. 179,
185)-'Income may be defined as the gain derived from capital,
from labor or from both combined,' provided it be understood to
include profit gained through a sale or conversion of capital assets,
to which it was applied in the Doyle Case (pp. 183, i85)."'16 Such
a gain as that which was taxed in Brewster v. Walsh seems fairly
comprehended within the scope of the foregoing statement. The
real significance of the definition lies in the fact that the words
"gain" and "profit" are employed as descriptive of "income,"
and that receipt of money or something of exchangeable value
is of the essence of income in a constitutional sense.' 7 The diminution of capital assets is not the legal, though it may be the economic
test, for the court in Eisner v. Macomber, supra, goes so far as to
say, by way of dictum, that if a shareholder disposes of dividend
stock, and in so doing realizes a profit, such profit is income, though
by the sale he necessarily disposes of a part of his capital interest.
In Lynch v. Hornby' 8 it was held that Congress could tax as income, under the Sixteenth Amendment, an extraordinary cash
dividend. In Peabody v. Eisner49 a dividend of shares in another
corporation was held so taxable. As between life-tenant and
remainder-man, the Federal Courts apply the so-called Massachusetts rule that a dividend representing profits, whether regular
or extraordinary, if in cash goes to the life-tenant as income, and
if in stock, to the remainderman.2 s Yet in all these cases that which
is called income is merely the severed increment of pre-existing
capital.
16

The courts own analysis of its definition is interesting. Discussing
the significance of the words, "gain derived from capital," Justice Pitney says:
"Here we have-the essential matter: not a gain accruing to capital, not a growth
or increment of value in the investment; but a gain, a profit, something of exchangeable value proceeding from the property, severed from the capital however
invested or employed, and coming in, being 'derived' that is, received or drawn
by the recipient, (the taxpayer) for his separate use, benefit and disposal; that
is income derived from property. Nothing else answers the description."
7 Mr. Charles E. Hughes and Mr. George W. Wickersham, of counsel
in Eisner v. Macomber, both emphasize the necessity of realization and receipt
to constitute income. Potentiality is not enough. Mr. Hughes says, at p. 195:
"Where investments are concerned there is no income until there has been a
separate, realized gain." Mr. Wickersham, at p. 199: "Capital gains (being
mere increases in valuation) are not income until realized." See also Professor
T. R. Powell, The Supreme Court and the Constitution, 35 Pol. Sci. Q. 411, 418.
'8 247 U. S.330 (1918), the dividend here paid out of a surplus existing
prior to Feb. 25, 1913, the effective date of the Amendment. This shows how
clearly receipt is of the essence of income.
19247 U. S. 347 (1918).
20
Gibbons v. Mahon 136 U. S.549 (189o).

NOTES

Referring to the dictum in Eisner v. Macomber, supra, as to
the taxability as income of the profits derived from the sale of
dividend stock, the court in the principal case said that in view
of a long line of previous decisions, that statement must have been
applied to the case of a trader, and not an individual who merely
changes the character of his investment. This limitation is unwarranted and is but an effort to substitute the economic for the
legal and constitutional conception of income. 2' The Supreme
Court has evinced slight regard for the science of economics when
solving purely constitutional problems. Just as they refused in
differentiating direct and indirect taxes to apply the economic
tests of shiftability, incidence, and consciousness of paying, so in
determining meaning of income, they will have none of the economists' analogies to "tree and fruit," "fund and flow."22 The
science of economics, whilst auxiliary to law, must, when dealing
with legal matters, be treated as wholly subordinate.
As suggested above, the problem raised in Brewster v. Walsh
is capable of another solution. For although the Supreme Court
should fail to consider the tax on capital increase when realized
by sale as a tax on income, still it is only an indirect tax and as
such the Act is valid in toto. For a definition of direct taxes we
are less put to, than in finding a workable definition of income.
The Constitution recognizes but two kinds of taxes, direct and
"duties, imposts, and excises." ' 23 Since that twentieth day of
August, 1787 when Mr. King asked what was the precise meaning
of direct taxation and no one answered him,24 because no one knew,
the term has been much discussed, 25 but it has at last come down
to this: direct taxes are capitation taxes and those levied on property, real or personal, because of ownership thereof. In the Succession Tax Case, 26 in the Court's own summary of its decision
in the Pollock Case,2 7 it is said that a direct tax was there held to
be one imposed "solely" because of "general" ownership of property.

In Eisner v. Macomber, supra, at pages 2o5 and 217, the

words "solely" and "general" are discarded, either because they
add nothing to the definition or because it was feared they unduly
restrict its scope.
2126 R. C. L., Secs.
L. R. A. 1917 E. 566.

22For

120, 121.

For state and English authorities see Note,

a brief and lucid discussion of the difference between the legal and

economic conceptions of capital and income, see Walter Strachan, The English
Law of Capital and Income, 62 U. of P. L. Rev. 707. The economist views them
in the concrete, the lawyer in the abstract.
3 Supra, n. io.
2Madison's

Journal of the Constitutional Convention.

Of the opinion

in that body as to what was a direct tax, Professor Seligman says "only one thing
is sure, namely that no one knew exactly what was meant by a direct tax, because
no two
people agreed." The Income Tax, p. 569.
25

J. H. Riddle, The Supreme Court's Theory of a Direct Tax, I5 Mich.

L. Rev. 566; D. W. Morrow, The Income Tax Amendment, zo Col., L. Rev. 379.
26 Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U. S. 41, 82 (1900).
7 157 U. S. 429 (1895); rehearing, 158 U. S. 6oi (1895).
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Is the tax in Brewster v. Walsh imposed by reason of the
plaintiff's ownership of the bonds? It would seem not, though
the Supreme Court has not as yet pointed out the criterion by which
to determine the question. We do know, however, that it should
be decided according to truth and substance, without regard to
form. If this be so, the tax is on a particular business transaction,
the use to which the property is put, the privilege of its disposal,
and is measured in amount by the extent of the gain. Unless
there is a gain, there is no tax to pay, but gain would be immaterial
if the tax were imposed by reason of ownership. It may well be
urged that the right to sell or dispose of property is one of the inherent incidents of ownership, and that a tax on the sale is a tax
on the subject-matter of the sale; an argument supported by many
decisions.n But is there not merely a formal difference between
the tax here considered and those numerous stamp taxes which
have been imposed upon particular business transactions, and which
have been uniformly sustained? Thomas v. United States2 1 held
a.stamp tax on the sale of shares by a broker constitutional, as it
was not a direct tax but an excise on a particular business transaction. The court there said that Brown v. Marylando was
inapposite, since that case did not involve the distinction between
direct and indirect taxation. In Nicol v. Ames3 ' it was objected.
that a stamp tax on each sale or agreement to sell made at any
exchange or board of trade was direct. The court held it was
not, refusing to subject it to a "microscopic examination as to the
purely economic or theoretical nature of the tax." 32 The court
does lay emphasis on the fact that it is a duty or excise laid upon
the privilege and facilities offered at exchanges, and intimates
that such a tax on sales made in the open market would be open
to objection, but it is difficult to see how the fact that the members
of a voluntary association, such as a board of trade, afford themselves certain facilities can be the determining matter in testing
the nature of such a tax.
The Revenue Act of I91831 imposes a stamp tax on any "deed,
instrument, or writing, whereby any lands, tenements, or other
realty sold shall be granted, assigned, transferred, or otherwise
conveyed to, or vested in, the purchaser or purchasers," the
amount of the tax to be measured by the consideration. A similar
tax is imposed on all sales or transfers of corporate stock.3 4 The
constitutionality of these provisions has not come before the
courts. Can it be said that such taxes are imposed "by reason
24

2 Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat.'419, 444 (1827); Almy v. California,
How. 169, 174 (i86o); Welton v. Missouri, 9I U. S. 275, 279 (x875).
2 192 U. S. 363 (19o4).
30
Supra, n. 28.
3' 173 U. S. 509 (1899).
32 Peckham, J., at p. 515.
33Schedule A-7, 40 Stat. 323.
34 Schedule A-4.
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of ownership?" To measure a tax by the consideration involved
certainly savors more, if at all, of taxation by reason of ownership,
than does a tax measured by the gain the vendor derives from the
transaction.
When the Supreme Court comes to consider Brewstef v.
Walsh, it will do so, as it did in Eisner v. Macomber, supra, from
a purely legal standpoint, .without undue deference to economic'
theories, and unembarrassed by a consideration of the fiscal exigencies of the Government. To ascribe to the word "incomes"
in the Sixteenth Amendment the same meaning as is conveyed in
the statute by "gains, profits, and income,' 35 as it has indicated
that it will do, will settle once and for all those nice questions as
to the constitutional meaning of "income," which are now arising. Failing to do so the Court can definitely classify as indirect
taxes those imposed on the gains and profits derived from dealings
in property, real and personal, without doing violence to either
precedent or Constitution. It is highly desirable that the Court
shall also provide some criterion by which to determine whether
and when taxes are imposed by reason of ownership.

E. H. S.
THE DIFFICULTY IN DETERMINING THE POINT AT WHICH
ATTEMPT EMERGES FROM PREPARATION.-In criminal law attempt
is an offense that presents a problem at once intricate and important. Although it is in a sense an unsuccessful effort to commit a
crime, yet it is a crime which requires for its completion the same
two elements that are essential in all other crimes, namely, act
and intent., Aftempt has often been defined' and frequent efforts
have been made to formulate fixed rules which would be applicable
to all the cases likely to arise. The courts have sometimes approached the problem with confusion, but they have in general
reached satisfactory conclusions.
An examination of the authorities would seem to warrant
the following definition: "An attempt is a crime which consists
of a specific intent to commit some particular crime accompanied
35These three words first appeared, joined by a copulative conjunction,
in the English Income Tax Acts of 1842 and 1853. The Federal Income Tax
Act of 1862 and all subsequent acts have so employed them. It is not unwarranted to say that at the time of the adoption of the Sixteenth Amendment
they conveyed a common meaning to the average mind. Noscitur a sociis.
It is not necessarily true that "income" means the same thing in the Constitution, as in an act of Congress. Towne v. Eisner, 245 U. S. 418 (1918). But in
seeking for a definition of the word as used in the Amendment, the court points
out in Eisner v. Macomber, at p. 207, that the inquiry must be directed toward
ascertaining the popular conception of income.

I State v. Thompson, 31 Nev. 209, IOI Pac. 557 (1909); People v. Petros,
25 Cal. App. 236, 143 Pac. 246 (1914).

2Burrill, Law Dictionary 175; Bouvier's Law Dictionary, 205; -Clark's
Criminal Law, 3 ed., 138; Bishop, New Criminal Law, Vol. 1,8 ed., par. 728;
Wharton's Criminal Law, Vol. i,ii ed., par. 212.

26o
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by an act directed toward the fulfillment of the intent, the act
being more than an act of preparation but being one which fails
to result in the crime intended."
Assuming that there is present a specific intent to commit
some particular crime and that some'act toward the fulfillment
of the intent has been done without accomplishing the crime intended, it is apparent that the important question to be decided
in determining whether an attempt has been committed is whether
the act is one of preparation only, or whether it is one that has
proceeded beyond the stage of preparation.
The difficulty of determining when preparation ends and
attempt begins has existed so long and has confronted so many
courts that it is but natural that a number of tests would in the
course of time be advanced for its solution. The following are
the principal tests that have been advanced and applied: (i) The
act must be the defendant's last act before success. 3 While it is
usually true that acts which are expected to bring about the
ultimate crime without further effort on the part of the criminal
are near enough, (unless the expectation is very absurd), 4 yet such
a test is unsatisfactory in view of the many decided cases in which
attempts were held to have been committed although the acts
done were far from being the last acts before complete success; 5
(2) A second test is that the defendant's act unless interrupted
by natural causes outside of his control should necessarily result
in the ultimate crime intended.A This test has also been shown
to be unsatisfactory, on the ground that such acts usually result
in the ultimate crime and that adherence to such a strict rule
would prevent in most cases any conviction on a charge of attempt
to commit a crime;7 (3)A third test is that the overt act must
come sufficiently near to the completion of the full crime intended
that its punishment is a matter of public concern. Under this
test acts immediately connected with the commission of a crime
will be considered attempts to commit it;8 and the proximity of
the acts to the ultimate crime will be determined with reference
to the gravity of the contemplated crime. 9 The fault in this test
lies in the fact-that it is indefinite, and that it is still a question of
degree as to how near to success the act must come before preparation becomes attempt; (4) Finally, it has been stated that, "so
3 Lovett v. State, i9Tex. 174 (x857).
45 Commonwealth v. Kennedy, 170 Mass. 18, 48 N. E. 770 (1897).
Uhl's Case, 6 Gratt. 7o6 (Va. 1849); David H. Beale, Jr., i6 Harvard
Law Review 5oi; Ex parte Turner, 3 Okla. Cr. 168, 104 Pac. i07i (909).
6Regina v. Eagleton, 24 L. J. M. C. 158; Regina v. Cheeseman, 3r L. J.
M. C. 89; i Wharton, Criminal Law, ro ed. par. x81; People v. Murray, 14
Cal. 159 (859); U.S. v. Stephens, 8 Sawy. 1i6 (1882); Sipple v. State, 46 N. J.
L. ;97 (1884); State v. Hewett, i58 N. C. 627, 74 S.E. 356 (1912); People v.
Grubb, 24 Cal. App. 604, 141 Pac. IO51 (1914).
7Commonwealth v. Kennedy, supra.
8 1 Bishop, Criminal Law, sec. 763.
'Bishop, New Criminal Law, Vol. i. 8 ed., sec. 76o.
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long as the acts are confined to preparation only and can be abandoned before any trangression of the law, or of other's rights, they
are within the sphere of intent and do not amount*to attempt. "10
Such a statement, however, begs the question, for, if the acts are
merely in preparation they can be abandoned, while if they have
gone beyond preparation there is no longer a locus penitentiae."
This difficulty in determining the precise point at which
attempt emerges from preparation is clearly illustrated by a recent
Pennsylvania case, Commonwealth v. Puretta, 1" in which the defendant was convicted of an attempt to commit arson. In that
case gasoline and other inflammable materials connected by paper
fuses had been arranged by the defendant in a rear room of a building which was used partly for dwelling purposes. As a result of
this act of the defendant, the floor became saturated with the
gasoline and the atmosphere became permeated with its fumes.
There was evidence to the effect that one of the fuses had been
lighted by the defendant, and also that a gas jet was to the defendant's knowledge left dimly burning in a hallway leading to the
room. The court, after reciting the above facts and referring to
many cases on attempts, stated: "We can reach only one conclusion: that the evidence clearly establishes the crime of attempt
to burn, as set forth in the indictment. "11
The court arrived at its decision upon all the facts without
reference to any particular test. It might be interesting, therefore, to examine the facts of this case with reference to the tests
above mentioned in order to determine upon what principles the
decision could have been based.
In the first 'place the court could have rested its decision upon
the single fact that the fuse had been lighted. 14 This result would
be reached by the application of any one of the first three tests,
(the fourth is so unsound that it will not be considered); for by
lighting that fuse the defendant had done his last act toward committing the ultimate crime intended; he had done an act which
would have necessarily resulted in the crime of arson unless it was
interrupted by natural causes outside of his control; and he had
done an act in such proximity to the crime of arson that its punishment was a matter of public concern.
In the second place, ignoring the evidencethat the fusehad been
lighted by the defendant, there was still sufficient evidence of an
attempt to commit arson under the third test. The arrangement
of highly inflammable materials in the room with a lighted gas jet
in the hallway, was an act so immediately connected with the crime
of arson that its punishment becomes a matter of public concern.
The present
case is readily distinguishable from the case of Coin10
Commonwealth v. Egan, i9 Pa. xo. (1899).
Criminal Law, 3 ed., ISo.
Commonwealth v. Puretta, 74 Pa. Super. Ct. 463 (1920).

1 Clark's
12

v. Puretta, supra.
14Queen v. Goodman, 22 Up. Can., C. P. 338 (1872).
13 Commonwealth
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monwealth v. Peaslee,' 5 for in that case a condition absolutely
harmless without further effort was created, while in the iistant
case the condition created was highly dangerous in itself. But on
these facts alone no attempt was conimitted under the first two
tests.
The first impression created by the instant case is that it is
unsatisfactory because it was decided generally upon all its facts
without laying down a definite rule for guidance in later cases.
An examination of the cases on attempts, however, seems to show
that no definite rule as to what constitutes an attempt to commit
a crime can be laid down for all the cases likely to arise.16 The
various tests suggested may be useful in some cases but none of
them can be accepted as drawing a sharp line of demarcation
between preparation and attempt. Each case must be determined
upon its own facts and its facts must be considered with reference
to the gravity of the ultimate crime intended.
H.F.B.
THE POWER OF CONGRESS TO REGULATE INTRASTATE RATES.
-Under authority of the Interstate Commerce Act and the Transportation Act of 1920 the Interstate Commerce Commission
during the past year authorized general increases in interstate
railroad rates and fares throughout the United States.2 Upon the
refusal of the Public Service Commission of New York to allow
the establishment on short notice of corresponding increases in
intrastate passenger fares, the railroads of New York filed with
the Interstate Commerce Commission a petition for relief alleging
that the action of the State Commission created discrimination
against interstate commerce; and the Interstate Commerce Commission authorized increased intrastate fares on the same basis
per mile as the interstate fares. 3 The case came before the Supreme Court of Kings County, New York, on motion for an injunction to restrain4 two of the carriers from enforcing the increases
in intrastate fares.
After finding that the amount of interstate traffic on the two
roads in question was so small as to be negligible, Judge Benedict
granted the injunction, holding (a) that Congress has no power,
15 177 Mass. 267, 59 N. E. 55 (igoi). The defendant fastened a candle to
a block of wood and placed the same in a pan of turpentine in the building. He
then left the premises, intending to return later and light the candle. While
returning, he changed his mind. Held: the defendant was not guilty of an
attempt to burn the building; his acts ttmounted to mere preparation.
16 David H. Beale, Jr., I6 Harvard Law Review, 502.
'41 Stat. 456, 457; amending Act of Feb. 4, 1887, 24 Stat. 379, 38o, as
amended.
2 Ex parte 74, Increased Rates, 58 I. C. C. 220 (1920).
3 Rates of N. Y. C., and Other Railroads of New York, 59 I. C. C., 290
(1920).
4

People v. Long Island Railroad & Staten Island Rapid Transit Railroad,

64 N. Y. Law Journal 71

(8920).
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either directly or indirectly through the Interstate Commerce
Commission, to fix intrastate rates; (b) but conceding that Congress
has this power, it has not conferred authority to fix such rates
on the Interstate Commerce Commission; (c) and even conceding
that Congress has this power and has conferred this authority on
the Commission, the latter can exercise its authority only to remove
unjust discrimination against interstate or foreign commerce
or against individuals or localities in interstate or foreign commerce.
Two questions of great importance are here raised: (i) What
is the extent of the Federal power to regulate intrastate rates?
(2) To what extent has this power been conferred upon the Interstate Commerce Commission?
i. It cannot be disputed that where rates fixed for intrastate
transportation have worked unjust discrimination against interstate traffic, Congress has the power to regulate such intrastate
rates. 5 This is true even if the intrastate rates be granted the
presumption of reasonableness.6 Nor does it matter whether the
intrastate rates are maintained by state authority or by the voluntary act of the carrier. 7 And a review of the cases indicates that
the question cannot be made one of degree of discrimination; on
the contrary, the slightest discrimination against interstate commerce raises an occasion upon which Congress has the power to
act.8
But a broader question than that of active, tangible and specific acts of discrimination is here presented. It is whether Congress
has the power to establish such unified control over all the rail5 Houston, Easf & West Texas Railway Co., v. U. S., 234 U. S. 342 (1914);
American Express Co., v. Caldwell, 244 U. S. 617 (1917); Illinois Central Railroad v. Public Utilities Commission, 245 U. S. 493 (1918).
6 American Express Co., v. Caldwell, supra. Justice Brandeis in this
case said: "Both rates (i. e., intrastate and interstate) may lie within the zone
of reasonableness and yet ijnvolve unjust discrimination. Proceedings to remove unjust discrimination are aimed directly only at the relation of the rates."

7 Illinois Central Railroad v. Public Utilities Commission, supra.

s Justice Hughes, in the Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U. S. 352 (1912),
said, in reviewing the authorities: "This reservation to the states (i. e., of control over internal commerce) manifestly is only of that authority which is consistent with and not opposed to the grant to Congress. There is no room in
our scheme of government for the assertion of State power in hostility to the
authorized exercise of Federal power. The authority of Congress extends to
every part of interstate commerce, and to every instrumentality or agency by
which it is carried on; and the full control by Congress of the subjects committed
to its regulation is not to be denied or thwarted by the commingling of interstate
and intrastate operations. This is not to say that the Nation may deal with
the internal concerns of the State, as such, but that the execution by Congress
of its constitutional power to regulate interstate commerce is not limited by the
fact that intrastate transactions may have become so interwoven therewith that
the effective government of the former incidentally controls the latter. This
conclusion necessarily results from the supremacy of the national power within
its appointed sphere." McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 (i8i9); Interstate Commerce Commission, 221 U. S. 612 (1911); Southern Railway v. U. S.,
222 U. S. 20 (1911); Mondou v. N. Y., N. H., & H. R. R. Co., 223 U. S. I (1912).
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roads of the country, by fixing the rates for transportation, as will
cause each type of traffic, whether interstate or intrastate, to bear
its fair share of the burden of the nation's transportation. And
contrary to the decision of Judge Benedict, it is submitted that
Congress does have such power.
The Constitution gives to Congress authority to regulate
commerce between the states.8 To regulate means "to foster,
protect, control and restrain, with appropriate regard for the
welfare of those who are immediately concerned and of the public
at large." 1 The power of Congress in this field is supreme."
And where any state enactment interferes in any way with
the
12
exercise of this power of Congress, the state act must fall.
Since Congress has the power to so regulate, the method to
be pursued to carry out the fostering and developing of interstate
commerce is a matter for the determination of Congress;13 and in
enforcing its authority over interstate commerce, Congress can
adopt any means appropriate to the end to be served. 14 Any
business, whether of public service or not, requires a proper revenue for successful development; and Congress has recognized
and ordered that railroads shall receive such proper revenue.'5
As a practical matter of good railroading, this result can best be
assured by a unified control. It will not be denied that Congress
has this power of unified control over all interstate commerce. 16
But in exercising such control, how is it possible to separate the
interstate from the intrastate? How can it be determined what
part of the annual cost of operating a railroad is due to interstate
commerce, what part to intrastate; how can it be known what
portion of a railroad's net profits are due to interstate and what
portion to intrastate commerce? For, to continue to view the
situation in a practical light, there are very few, if any, railroads
in this country which do not, in some way or another, engage in
interstate commerce; and no matter how little of the traffic of a
road is interstate, the railroad which ships any goods at all in interstate commerce is, by virtue of the above premises, subject to
Federal control. The Supreme Court has recognized that interstate and intrastate commerce may become so interwoven as to
be inseparable and that in this case the Federal power of rate9

Art. i, Sec. 8.
0Second Employers' Liability Cases, 223 U. S. 1 (1912).
"Wabash Railway v. Illinois, 118 U. S. 557 (1887); Southern Railway
V. U.

S., 222 U.

S.

20 (1911).

"Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U. S. 485 (1877); In re Rahrer, 140 U. S.545 (1891);
Houston, etc., Railway v. U. S., supra.
13Minnesota Rate Cases, supra.
14McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 (18ig); Atlantic C. L. R. Co.,
v. Riverside Mills, 219 U. S. 186 (1911); Hoke v. U. S., 227 U. S. 308 (1913).
1"See Sec. I5a of the Interstate Commerce Act as amended by theTransportation Act of 1920, 41 Stat. 456, 457, infra.
26Minnesota Rate Cases, supra; Houston, etc., Railway v. U. S., supra.
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regulation extends to both. 7 In stating the purpose of the Transportation Act of 1920, Congress recognizes and asserts in itself
this power. 8 To this degree, therefore, the power of Federal
control can hardly be disputed.
But even if it be granted, arguendo, that the interstate and
intrastate business of those railroads which engage in both can be
so separated that proper valuation can be made of them insofar
as they are interstate carriers and a proper revenue ordered for
them on this basis, there is another ground on which Federal
authority clearly extends over them in their intrastate capacity,
namely, in the power to remove discrimination against interstate
commerce.
Congress, it has been seen, can remove any discrimination
whatever under which undue prejudice is suffered by persons or
localities in interstate commerce or by interstate commerce itself.18 If Congress is hot authorized to fix all intrastate rates,
the situation arises where intrastate carriers, or state commissions
regulating them, can so adjust their intrastate rates as to materially affect the revenue which Congress has decreed proper for
roads in interstate commerce. 20 This would be a direct and active
interference with Congressional regulation of interstate commerce,
such an interference as cannot constitutionally be permitfed.21
Under this situation there would arise, from another point of
view, discrimination against interstate commerce. Shippers in
interstate commerce would, by virtue of Federal rate regulation,.
pay a certain amount for the transportation of goods over a certain
distance. If intrastate carriers be allowed to determine their own
rates, these rates could be so adjusted that shippers in intrastate
commerce would pay a smaller amount for shipping their goods
over the same distance, or an amount smaller in proportion to the
distance. The result would be that for the same kind, quality
t

7Minnesota Rate Cases, supra: "If the situation has become such, by
reason of the blending of the intrastate and interstate operations of the interstate carriers, that adequate regulation of their interstate rates cannot be maintained without imposing requirements with respect to their intrastate rates which
substantially affect the former, it is for Congress to determine, within the limits
of its constitutional authority over interstate commerce and its instruments,
the measure of regulation it should apply." Semble: Houston, etc., Railway v.

U. S., supra.
IsSection i5a of the Interstate Commerce Act as amended by the Transportation Act of 1920, 41 Stat. 456, 457, infra.
19Minnesota Rate Cases, supra; Houston, etc., Railway v. U. S., supra;
American Express Co., v. Caldwell, supra; Illinois Central Railroad v. Public
Utilities Commission, supra.
20A carrier engaging in both interstate and intrastate commerce could
reduce its intrastate rates and thereby lessen the revenue of the carrier, and of
the rate group as a whole. Then again, a purely intrastate road competing with
a road that is both interstate and intrastate can, by lowering its rates sufficiently
take all, or practically all the intrastate business from the latter road between
competitive intrastate points; and this would lessen the revenue of the interstate carrier and of the rate group as a whole.
21Minnesota Rate Cases, supra; Houston, etc., Railway v. U. S., supra.
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and quantity of service, shippers in interstate commerce would
have to pay more than those in intrastate commerce. There
could hardly be clearer discrimination against interstate commerce
than to make shippers pay a higher rate for transportation simply
they ship travel in interstate instead of intrabecause the goods
state commerce.22 The Supreme Court has recognized that discrimination in this manner is possible; it has even intimated that
it is within the Federal power to remove it.23 The Interstate
Commerce Commission has in several recent cases declared the
above situation to be discriminatory against interstate commerce;
and in regulating these intrastate rates so as to remove the discrimination, the Commission has asserted in24 Congress and in itself the
power to determine all intrastate rates.
It is therefore submitted that Congress has the power to
regulate the intrastate rates of all railroads; and that when this
question reaches the Supreme Court of the United States, that
court will so hold. 5
2. The second question raised by the principal case is as to
to the extent to which Congress has conferred upon the Interstate

Commerce Commission its power to regulate intrastate rates.
It is submitted that by Sections 13 and i~a of the Interstate Commerce Act as amended by the Transportation Act of 1920,2' Congress has conferred upon the Commission authority to regulate
all intrastate rates to the same extent to which Congress itself can
regulate them.
Under Section iSa, the Commission is authorized to "initiate,
modify or adjust" rates in such a way that carriers "as a whole
(or as a whole in each of such rate groups or territories as the
Commission may from time to time designate)" shall earn an aggregate annual net operating income which shall be a fair return
for the value of their property. This authority, so clearly expressed, cannot be carried out unless every railroad which in any
way engages in interstate commerce be included in such rategrouping, and unless such railroads be included to the full extent
This was exactly the situation in Houston, etc., Railway v. U. S., supra.
23Illinois Central Railroad v. Public Utilities Commission, supra: "Had

the Commission regarded the discrimination as State-wide it is but reasonable
to believe that it would have said so in its findings. And had it intended to require or authorize a State-wide readjustment of the intrastate rates it doubtless
would have given direct expression to that purpose, which easily could have been
done in a few lines."
24Intrastate Rates within Illinois (passenger), 59 I. C. C. 350 (1920);
Wisconsin Passenger Fares, 59 I. C. C. 39, (1920); Arkansas Rates & Fares,
59 I. C. C. 471 (1920); Minnesota Fares & Charges, 59 I. C. C. 502 (1920);
Iowa Passenger Fares & Charges, 6o I. C. C. 55. (1921); Montana Rates &
Fares, 6o 1. C. C. 6i (1921); Ohio Rates, Fares & Charges, 6o I. C. C. 78 (1921);
Intrastate Rates in Illinois (freight), 6o I. C. C. 92 (1921).
25 The question herein involved will be presented to the Supreme Court
on Feb. 28, 1921, in a case appealed from a Federal court in the state of Wisconsin.
2 41 Stat. 456, 457.
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of their property and earnings in both interstate and intrastate
commerce.
Under Section 13, the Commission is authorized, upon finding that any rate is discriminatory against interstate or foreign
commerce or against persons or localities in interstate or foreign
commerce, to declare such rate unlawful and to prescribe the rate
that shall be charged. So-by virtue of this section the Commission
has authority to regulate the rates of purely intrastate carriers
which, while they may not engage in interstate commerce in any
way, can yet throw a great burden on interstate commerce and
interstate commerce and
exert such clear discrimination against
2
those who carry on such commerce. r
It might be urged that these sections are void as being in
conflict with paragraph 2a of Section i of the Interstate Commerce
Act, which stipulates, "The provisions of this Act .......
shall not apply to the transportation of passengers or property
..
wholly within one state and not shipped to or from a
..
foreign country from or to any place in the United States."28
But these provisions can be interpreted so as to avoid a conflict;
and they must be so interpreted.19 Sections 13 and i5a must be
considered as exceptions to paragraph 2a of Section 130; for the

latter will then retain a very definite meaning: that in every matter
other than those specifically excepted the Interstate Commerce
Commission has no jurisdiction over intrastate roads engaged in
intrastate traffic. Sections 13 and i5a are complementary to each
other; the authority granted by each of these sections is accessory
to and completes the authority granted by the other; and to hold
that either or both of these sections are void would be to render
the Act self-contradictory and illogical.
3. Accepting the first two propositions herein advanced, the
solution of the question presents no difficulty. If Congress has
the power to fix all intrastate rates and has delegated that power
to the Interstate Commerce Commission, the action of the Commission was in the principal case proper and the bill for injunction
should have been dismissed.'
B.C.J.
27The Commission has so interpreted its own authority in the cases cited
in footnote (24) supra.
8 24 Stat. 379, 380.
2 Where there are two provisions of an Act, the one special and the other
general, apparently conflicting, the special must be taken as intended to be an
exception to the general. The legislature cannot be supposed to have intended
a conflict. Rodgers v. U. S., 185 U. S. 83 (1902).
80Houston, etc., Railway v. U. S., supra, gives an analogous interpretation under the Interstate Commerce Act prior to the Transportation Act of.
1920.
31This was the conclusion reached by Judge Hasbrook in an unreported
case in New York arising out of the same facts as those of the principal case.
Since this note went to press the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme
Court, in a decision handed down without opinion, has reversed the decree of
Judge Benedict and disolved the injunction granted in People v. Long Island,
etc., R. R. supra. The case has been appealed to the court of appeals of New
York and is listed for argument late in February.
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VALIDITY OF A CONTRACT TO BuY AND SELL ALL THE GOODS

NEEDED BY A BUYER IN His BUSINESS.-A contract to buy and

sell all the goods the buyer needs or wants in his business for a
certain time is, at first glance, open to two objections: it is uncertain as to quantity, and it lacks mutuality. By mutuality is
meant not mutuality of remedy, as it is used in the courts of Equity,
but mutuality of obligation which exists when mutual promises
constitute the consideration for each other. The above objections
were decisive of the early cases on contracts of this type, of which
the case of Bailey v. Austrian is representative.' In that case a
contract to purchase all the pig iron wanted by the vendee in his
foundry business for a given period was held invalid for the reason
that "there was no absolute engagement on the vendee's part to
want and to purchase any iron of the vendor, and hence no mutuality of engagement." This decision was followed by the same court
in a case involving a contract to furnish to2 a retailer all the shoe
packs required in his business that season.
In later cases decided in other jurisdictions, a broader view
was taken of the question. The courts reasoned that where the
vendee is engaged in an established business so that his requirements of the commodity are readily ascertainable, the contract
is not without certainty as to quantity since id certum est, quod
certum reddi potest. Moreover, if the vendee promises to buy all
of a certain commodity he will need or require for a certain time
in that business, he is bound by the promise and there is no lack
of mutuality. The great weight of modern authority is in accord
with this latter view. The business is usually that of a manufacturer3; but the question has arisen in the case of hotel proprietors,4 steamship owners, 5 contractors, 6 and retail dealers, 7 and
II9 Minn. 535 (1873).
2

Tarbox v. Gotzian, 20 Minn. 140 (1873).
National Furnace Co. v. Keystone Mfg. Co., 110 Ill. 427 (1884). Excelsior Wrapper Co. v. Messinger, 116 Wis. 549, 93 N. W. 459 (1903). Fertilizer Co. v. Phosphate Co., 121 Fed. 298 (1903). Lima Locomotive Co. v.
3

Steel Castings Co., 155 Fed. 77 (907).
Sterling Coal Co. v. Bleaching Co., 162
Fed. 848 (19o8). Marx v. Malting Co., 169 Fed. 582 (19o9). Holmes v. Detroit, 158 Mich. 137, 122 N. W. 506 (19o9). Healy v. Alcohol Mfg. Co., 125
La. Ann. io38, 52 So. 15o (1910). Mining Co. v. Mining Co., 188 Fed. 179
(iiI).
Bartlett Springs Co. v. Standard Box Co., 16 Cal. App. 671, 117 Pac.

934 (I911).

Contra: Bessire v. Corn Products Mfg. Co., 47 Ind. App. 298,

94 N. E. 353 (1911).

Smith v. Morse, 20 La. Ann. 220 (1868).
' Wells v. Alexandre, 13o N. Y. 642, 29 N. E. 142 (1891).
4

6 Campfield v. Sauer, 164 Fed. 833 (19o8).

N. Y. S. 347 (x98).

Rosenthal v. Brick Co., io8

Stuart v. Telephone Co., 16i Mich. 123,

125

N. W.

720 (191o).

7 Minnesota Lumber Co. v. Whitebreast Coal Co., 16o Ill. 85, 43 N. E.
774 (r8 95). Hickey v. O'Brien, 123 Mich. 6xi, 82 N. W. 241 (1900). Secor

v. Ardsley Ice Co., 2O N. Y. 603, 95 N. E. 1139 (1909). Walker Mfg. Co. v.
Swift & Co., 200 Fed. 529 (1912). Metzger v. Knox, 137 N. Y. S. 1129
(1912).

Macaroni Mfg. Co. v. Fiore, 47 Utah io8, 151 Pac. 984 (19r5).

v. Stevenson Co., 13o Minn. 151, 153 N. W. 316 (1915).

Scott

On the other hand some
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where the words "need" or "require" are used, the contracts are
usually held valid. However, where the engagement is to buy and
sell what the vendee may "want" or "desire, '.even though he is
engaged in an established business, the contract is held invalid
for uncertainty and lack of mutuality, the quantity to be purchased
being not certain, but dependent upon the will or wish of the
vendee.8 Where the buyer has no established business, the conis to purchase
tract is invalid regardless of whether his promise
what goods he "wants" or what he "requires." 9 In a case where
there was an established business but no mention of quantity, the
court refused to imply an agreement to buy all the materials needed
in the buyer's business.' 0
In -three recent cases the question here discussed was at
issue." Those of Wickham & Burton Coal Co. v. Farmers Lumber Co. and Hutchinson Gas Co. v. Wichita Gas Co. concern
contracts of a vendee in an established business to buy what quantity he will want. In the former case the engagement was to buy
all the coal which the vendee would want to purchase for seven
months at a certain price; in the latter, the engagement was to
take gas for a city which the vendee supplied, but the vendee was
.not bound to take its gas exclusively from the vendor. In both
cases the contracts were held invalid for. uncertainty and lack of
mutuality. In the case of American Trading Co. v. National
Fibre Co., a demurrer was sustained to a declaration which alleged
a contract to buy and sell respectively the vendee's entire consumption of vulcanized fibre for one year, but which did not aver that
the vendee was in an established business using a determinable
quantity of the material. This amounts to a "requirement" case
where the vendee is not in an established business. The three
cases afford excellent illustrations of the contracts of this class
which are most often held invalid and lacking in mutuality.
Although the rule as stated is well established, there is one
question arising in this class of cases which is not so clearly settled:
granting that the contract is valid, what is the extent of the yendee's obligation? Is he bound by the contract to remain in the
established business for the time covered by the contract and to
courts
which
use of
itself.

hold that a retail dealer or middle-man does not come within the rule,
they restrict to cover the case of an established business in which the
the thing required is but incidental to the carrying on .of the business
Crane v. Crane, io5 Fed. 869 (igoi). Jenkins & Co. v. Anaheim Sugar

Co., 247 Fed. 958 (1918).

8 Drake v. Vorse, 52 Ia. 417, 3 N. W. 465 (879). American Cotton Oil
Co. v. Kirk, 68 Fed. 791 (1895). Hoffman v. Maffioli, 104 Wis. 63o, 8o N. W.

333, 71 N. E. 1010 (1904).
1032 (i899). Higbie v. Rust, 211 Ill.
9 Rehm-Zeiher Co. v. F. G. Walker Co., i56 Ky. 6, i6o S.W.777 (1913).
20Cold Blast Transportation Co. v. Kansas City Bolt and Nut Co., 114
Fed. 77 (1902).
.9Wickham & Burton Coal Co. v. Farmers Lumber Co., i79 N. W. 417
(Iowa, 192o). Hutchinson Gas Co. v. Wichita Gas Co., 267 Fed. 35 (1920).
American Trading Co. v. National Fibre Co., i i Atl. 290 (Del. 1920).
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buy the quantity of the goods ordinarily required by the business;
or is his promise merely to buy from the vendor if he buys at all,
a promise which is broken only by buying from someone else?
It was held in a New York case 12 that -a vendee, having promised
to buy all the coal his steamships required for one year was liable
for the coal even though he sold his steamships and went out of
the business. On the other hand a Pennsylvania case 3 decided
that a vendee who promised to buy all the coal he should need for
his mill for a certain time did not break his contract by ceasing to
use coal on the discovery of gas on the premises. The view that
the only obligation of the vendee is to refrain from buying the
commodity from anyone other than the vendor is satisfactory from
the standpoint of mutuality, for such a promise is sufficient detriment to be good consideration for the vendor's promise; but when
it is considered that certainty, no less than mutuality, is necessary
to establish the validity of this type of contract, the view taken in
the New York case seems to be the correct one. If it is granted
that a contract is certain as to quantity because that quantity is
ascertainable, it would seem to follow that the parties should be
bound by that quantity,--the quantity which was in the contemplation of the parties when they contracted and which was fixed
by the ordinary needs of an established business.
L. H. McK.
THE EXCLUSION OF A COMMODITY FROM TRANSPORTATION IS

A CLASSIFICATION AND REGULATION UNDER INTERSTATE COMMERCE

AcT.-The jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission
is a question which has frequently been before the courts for determination. But in a recent case there was presented to the
Supreme Court of the United States for the first time the question
whether under the powers granted by the Interstate Commerce
Act the Commission had jurisdiction to determine the reasonableness of the proposal of the railroads to exclude from shipment
a commodity which had been transported for many years., The
Director General of Railroads had issued an order 2 cancelling the
2Wells v. Alexandre, supra. See also: Fertilizer Co. v. Phosphate Co.,
supra. Hickey v. O'Brien, supra.
" McKeever, Cook & Co. v. Canonsburg Iron Co. 138 Pa. 184, 20 Ati.
938 (1888). See also: Drake v. Vorse, supra, and note on Hickey v. O'Brien in
14 Harvard Law Review I5O.
' Director General of Railroads, et al., v. The Viscose Company, U. S.
Supreme Court Advance Opinions, decided Jan. 3, 1921.
2 The order was issued on Jan. 2T, 1920, under authority conferred by
the Federal Control Act (40 Stat. 451, 456). This same Act took away from
the Commission the power to suspend classifications or regulations when issued
by the President; but the power over them after hearing remained, and the
power to suspend was restored when the Transportation Act of 1920 (41 Stat.
456, 487) became effective. The action of the Director General of Railroads,
under consideration in the principal case, may, therefore, be treated as if it had
been taken by a carrier subject to the Act. Director General of Railroads,
et al., v. Viscose Company, supra.
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ratings on artificial and fibre silk as listed in the Consolidated
Freight Classification No. i,3 and including the same articles in
the list of commodities that would not be accepted for shipment.
The Viscose Company, a producer of artificial silk, brought a bill
in the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania asking for an injunction to restrain the Director
General and certain carriers from enforcing this order.4 The
District Court issued the injunction and the defendant carriers
appealed to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.
This court certified to the United States Supreme Court the following question:
"Did the District Court have jurisdiction to decide the matter
raised by the complainant's bill and thereupon to annul the said
action of the Director General of Railroads and enjoin the carriers
from complying therewith?"
The Supreme Court answered this question in the negative,
holding that this matter was one falling plainly within the exclusive initial jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission. 5
The content of Sections i, 3,6, 13 and 15 of the Interstate

Commerce Act,6 the construction of which was the point here at
issue, is that railroads subject to the Act must establish reasonable
rates, fares, charges, classifications, regulations and practices
affecting transportation, and that the Commission may grant
relief for anything done or committed in contravention of the Act.
It is clear, then, that if the order of the Director General that
silk shduld not be accepted for shipment constituted a change in
classification or regulation under the Commerce Act, jurisdiction
in this case to determine the reasonableness of the order was vested
in the Commission. The decision was that it did constitute a
change in both classification and regulation. Justice Clarke, in
his opinion, says: ".....
posed change . .- . .

.

in attempting to make the proit was necessary that the published

classification of rates should be withdrawn by change of the tariffs

3This consolidated classification, which became effective Dec. 30, 1919,
superseded previous freight classifications of the various carriers, the principal
of which were the Official, the Western and the Southern: see I. C. C., v. D. L.
& W., 220 U. S. 235 (1911); Consolidated Classification Case, 54 I. C. C. I

0919g).4 Viscose
Fed. 726

Company v. Hines, Director General of Railroads, et al., 263

(1920).

At about the same time the same question in a similar action came before the District Court for the Southern District of New York, which denied
the injunction, and on appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, which reversed the decree by a decision of two to one: Cheney Bros.,
v. Hines, et al., 266 Fed. 31o (1920). Since in the Supreme Court in the prificipal case the decision was five to four, an odd situation is presented in that of
the fourteen federal judges who have considered the question, seven have held
each way.
6Act of 1887, as amended: 24 Stat. 379, 38o; 34 Stat. 584, 586; 36 Stat.
539, 552; 41 Stat. 456, 487.
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on file and that notice should be given, through rule or regulation,
that the silk would not be accepted for shipment in the future.
Thus the supplement involved a change in the contents of previously filed classification lists and in a.rule or regulation of the
carriers. Classification in carrier rate-making is grouping,- the
associating in a designated list, commodities, which, because of
their inherent quality or value, or of the risks involved in shipment, or because of the manner or volume in which they are shipped
or loaded, and the like, may justly and conveniently be given
similar rates. To exclude a commodity from all classes is classification of it in -as real a sense and with as definite an effect as to
include it in any one of the usual classes. To strike artificial silk
from the first class and include it in the 'prohibited list' which, for
any cause, the carrier refuses to accept as freight, classifies it and
sets it apart in a group subject to special treatment,7 as much as if
it had been changed to the second class. We cannot doubt that
the 'exclusion' in this case was an attempted 'classification,' and
that the proposed change in Rule 38 was an attempted change of
regulation, applicable to artificial silks, and that when challenged
by the shipper the reasonableness of both presented a question for
decision within the exclusive initial jurisdiction of the Interstate
Commerce Commission. "
The decision is an important one. Prior to this case, the
Commission itself had asserted its authority to pass upon the
reasonableness of the exclusion of certain commodities from shipment.9 At the same time the courts had not hesitated to grant
7A denial of classification and class rates to a commodity in t&e Consolidated Freight Classification does not of necessity permanently deny freight
transportation to the article. Where no class rate is established for a given
service, commodity rates may be published, this being the general practice
when no established class rate constitutes an appropriate charge for the service.
For principles regarding the propriety of commodity rates see Rule 7a of Tariff
Circular No. i8-A, revised by order of the Interstate Commerce Commission,
effective March 31, x911; James & Abbott Co. v. B. & M. Railroad, 17 I. C. C.
273 (1909); I. C. C. v. L. & N. Railroad, 227 U. S. 88 (913).
It is also permissible for a carrier to establish special rules and regulations in a more limited
locality just as it may establish commodity rates. These rules and regulations
are generally established in tariffs known as "Exceptions to the Official (or other)
Classifications." As to the propriety of these, see Marx & Son v. I. C. Railroad Co., 36 I. C. C. 519 (915); Ludowici-Caledon Co. v. Railroads, 39 I. C. C.
407 (1916); Pacific Coast Biscuit Co. v. Southern Pacific Co., 49 I. C. C. 115
(1918); Anheuser Busch Brewing Association v. Railroads, 52 I. C. C. 555
(i919). Commodity rates are recognized as a possibility in the principal case,
but according to Justice Clarke's opinion it would make no difference in the
decision of the case whether or not commodity rates were to be later published
by the railroads.
8 The section of Consolidated Freight Classification No. i which listed
the commodities that would not be accepted for shipment.
9The exclusion of butter, eggs and dressed poultry from transportation
by lake and rail was found unreasonable by the Commission and the class rates
on those commodities restored: Lake-and-Rail Butter and Egg Rates, 29 1.
C. C. 45 (914).
The Commission considered the reasonableness of a rule excluding from class rates "articles with postage stamps affixed" and held the
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relief by injunction to shippers when a carrier attempted to exclude

certain articles from shipment. 10 The Supreme Court has now
settled the question definitely.
The principal case furnishes the first occasion where this
construction of the Interstate Commerce Act, that "classification
and regulation includes exclusion," has been upheld judicially."
Though novel, it is but a logical step in following the broad construction already given to the extensive powers of the Commission.
Of the three duties dev61ved upon a carrier by law, (a) to serve
(b) for reasonable compensation and (c) without unjust discrimination, the Commission's exclusive original jurisdiction over the
latter two has been long established." Is it other than natural
that when the question was presented to the Supreme Court, the
decision should uphold in the Commission jurisdiction of questions
involving the scope of the first of these duties? The exclusive
original jurisdiction of the Commission in matters arising under
the Interstate Commerce Act has been repreatedly recognized as
of utmost importance to the commerce of the country.13 The
court has here unquestionably followed the intention of Congress
in so interpreting the Act14 ; and it has also recognized and met the

demands of national commerce.15 The decision is logical, modern
and gratifying.
B.C.J.

exclusion proper: Consolidated Classification Case, 54 I. C. C. i (i919). The
Commission considered the exclusion of green hides in such a condition as to
damage other freight and decided that until special equipment could be obtained
the exclusion was proper: Western Classification Case, 25 L C. C. 442 (1912).
10 Southern- Express Co. v. R. M. Rose Co., 124 Ga. 581, 53 S. E. 185
(i96); American Express Co. v. Beer, 104 Miss. 247, 61 So. 3o6 (1914), L. R.
A. 19i8B, 446, annotated; Bluthenthal v. Southern R. R. Co. 84 Fed. 920
(1898); Crescent Liquor Co. v. Platt, 148 Fed. 894 (19o6); Royal Brewing Co.
v. M., K., & T. T. T. Co. 217 Fed. 146 (1914).
1An analogy to the principal case is to be found in Tilley v. Norfolk &
Western Ry. Co., 162 N. C. 37 (1913), where under state statutes as to intrastate commerce phrased similarly to the Interstate Commerce Act, the Supreme
Court of North Carolina held that the reasonableness of the exclusion of loose
hay from shipment was a matter for the State Corporation Commission and not
for the courts. The analogy is uncertain, however, for here the carriers were
really not excluding hay from shipment but were merely requiring it to be baled
before being shipped, an action which involved an entirely different question.
C. C. v. I. C. R. Co., 205 U. S. 452 (191o); B. & 0. R. Co. v. U. S.,
1I.
215 U. S. 481 (xgio); Robinson v. B. & 0., 222 U. S. 506 (1912); Morrisdale
Coal Co. v. P. R. R., 230 U. S. 304 (1913); Texas & Pacific R. Co. v. American
Tie Co., 234 U. S. 138 (1914); Loomis v. L. V. R. R., 240 U. S. 43 (1916). Wickwire Steel Co. v. N. Y. C. R. Co., 181 Fed. 316 (191o).
13Texas & Pacific R. R. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U. S. 426
(1907); Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U. S. 352 (1912); P. R. R. v. Clark Coal
Co., 238 U. S. 456 (19x5); Loomis v. L. V. R. R., supra.
14 House Report No. 923, 61st Congress, 2nd Session; Senate Report No.
355, 61st Congress, 2nd Session.
15 The demand for uniformity of rule where there are conflicts between
the views of different courts, or between the views of courts and of the Commission. This need is well illustrated by the decisions in the District Courts
in the principal case and in that of Cheney Bros. v. Hines, et al., supra, one
decree granting relief, the other denying relief.
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KNOWLEDGE OF THE DANGEROUS CONDITION AS AFFECTING

ONE'S

LIABILITY UNDER THE RULE OF RYLANDS V. FLETCHER.-

The owner of land who, for his own benefit, brings or collects
upon his premises anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, does
so at his peril and if it does escape and causes injury to the adjoining landowner he is liable without the proof of negligence. The
mere fact that the proprietor took reasonable precautions to prevent the escape is not sufficient, since he is under an absolute duty
to restrain the foreign substance. This is the rule as laid down by
1
the English courts in the celebrated case of Rylands v. Fletcher.
' 2
It is based on the maxim "sic utere tuo ut non alienum laedas. "
Not every use, however, will subject the owner to absolute liability.
It exists only where he has made a non-natural or excessive use of
his property, there being no liability for a natural use unless negligence be proved.,
In the recent case of Belvedere Fish Guano Company v.
Rainham Chemical Works 4 the defendants were engaged in the
manufacture of picric acid for the British Government during the
war. A new process had been invented for making the acid from
di-nitrol-phenol (DNT), a substance till that time chiefly used for
dyeing, and the defendants who were not experts in chemistry
knew nothing of the qualities of the substance, which, in fact, up
to this time had not been generally realized to be an explosive. It
did not explode by percussion and was difficult to set afire. A fire
occurred in the plant causing the D. N. T. to explode and injure
the plaintiff's adjoining property. The court held the defendants
liable under the principle of Rylands v. Fletcher and it was held
to be immaterial whether or not the defendants knew of the explosive character of the substance.
It is manifest that this was a non-natural use of the land as
defined by Lord Cairns in Rylands v. Fletcher. A violent explosive is certainly such a substance as is likely to cause great danger
I L. R. i Ex. 265 (1866), L. R. 3 H. L. 330 (1868).
For an interesting discussion of the conflicting interests of landowners
and the factors influencing the court's decision in Rylands v. Fletcher see article
by Professor Francis H. Bohlen, 59 U. of P. L. Rev., 317.
3The distinction between natural and non-natural uses of land was made
by Lord Cairns in Rylands v. Fletcher and has been recognized as valid by the
English courts. Non-natural uses were all such as were not necessary or incidental to the proper cultivation of the freehold. West v. Bristol Tramways
Company. 24 T. L. R. 478 (Eng. 19o8); Charing Cross, West End & Electric
Co. v. London Hydraulic Power Co., 30 T. L. R. 44 (Eng. 1914); National

Telephone Co. v. Baker (1892) 2 Chancery 186. In America the rule has been
followed in some states and rejected in others. It has been upheld in Ball v.
Nye. 99 Mass 582 (1868); Bradford Glycerine Co. v. St. Mary's Woolen Co.
6o Ohio St. 560. 54 N. W. 528 (1899). Contra see Collins v. Brown, 53 N. H.
t42 (1873); Losee v. Buchanan. Si N. Y. 485 (1873); Shire v. Consumers Gas
Co. 215 Pa. 399. 64 Atl. 541 (19o6). In the latter case the court had an excellent
opportunity to apply the doctrine of Rylands v. Fletcher, but held that the use
of a dangerous substance on the land merely subjects the owner to a greater
degree of care, commensurate with the risk.
436 T. L. R. 362 (Eng. 1920).

NOTES

if it escapes and is therefore imminently dangerous to the adjoining property owner. Therefore this case would seem clearly to
fall within the principle of Rylands v. Fletcher, unless there is
some element to take it out of the operation of that rule.
The
contention was made that the defendant did not know of the
explosive character of D. N. T. and he should therefore be relieved,
especially since the chemical was in fact explosive only under
extraordinary circumstances. Although in the opinion of the
majority of the court this point was not material, it was recognized•
in a very vigorous dissenting opinion as being a valid contention.
In the light of previous decisions 5 it would seem that knowledge of the dangerous character of the substance brought on the
land is not an important factor in the determination of the owner's
liability for the escape of the substance. In Crowhurst v. The
Burial Board of the Parish of Amersham,5 the defendants planted
a yew tree on their premises which grew and extended through the
division fence on to the plaintiff's land. The plaintiff's horse ate
of a portion projecting and died of poison contained therein. It
was held that the defendant was liable on the principle that it
was immaterial, whether they knew of the character of the tree
.or not; they must be held responsible for the natural consequences
of their own act. The suggestion in this case is that when a person
contemplates niaking a particular use of his property the burden
is on him to inquire thoroughly into the character of that use.
The very fact that he did not know the character of the substance
put him on his guard to investigate it and to understand its nature
before subjecting his land to its use. In view of this decision it
would seem that the court was correct in Belvedere Fish Guano
Company v. Rainham Chemical Works in saying that the matter
of the defendant's knowledge of the dangerous character of the
chemical was immaterial. The defendant was aware that he was
using on his premises an article about which he was totally ignorant.
It may or it may not have been an explosive, but before subjecting
his property to its use the duty was upon him to learn its exact
qualities. He cannot expect to absolve himself from absolute
liability for using a dangerous substance on his land on the ground
that he neglected to inquire whether or not the substance was in
fact dangerous.
The character of the work in this case raises an interesting
question. The defendants were engaged for the Government during the war and were therefore doing a patriotic work which was
certainly of general benefit to the community. In America the
courts which have rejected the rule have done so on the ground
that it was for the general economic benefit and welfare of the
community that a person should be free to use his land as he should
see fit and as long as he takes reasonable care and precautions in
6 West v. Bristol Tramways Co., supra; Crowhurst v. The Burial Board
of the Parish of Amersham, 4 Ex. 5 (1878).
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the use thereof he is not liable for any resulting damage. Although the English courts have refused to be influenced by industrial and economic development, it would seem that there is greater
reason for the relaxation of the rule in the present case, where the
work was not merely of economic benefit to the community, but
was of national importance and in defense of the realm. In view
of these circumstances the decision would seem to indicate the
inflexibility of the rule.
The doctrine of Rylands v. Fletcher is by no means confined
to the use of land causing injury to the adjoining landowner. It,
in fact, extends to any excessive or non-natural use of a private
right as where, according to Lord Moulton in Wing v. Omnibus
Coripany,6 "a member of the public makes undue or improper
use of the right which he enjoys in common with all others of using
the highway for traffic." Just as a landowner has the right to
make a natural use of his property, but can only make a nonnatural use at his peril, so an individual has a perfect right to use
the highway but is bound to so use it as not to prejudice the equal
rights of others, and where he puts a dangerous agency into the
highway he should be absolutely liable, since he is certainly prejudicing the rights of others.
In the case of Hutchins v. Maunder 7 the plaintiff had just
purchased a twelve year old automobile and was operating it on
the highway. Due to the defective condition of the steering gear
on account of wear, the driving shaft became separated from the
ball socket joint and injured the plaintiff in his lawful use of the
highway. The court said the imperfect condition could only have
been discovered by taking to pieces the steering gear, but the
defendant was not guilty of negligence in not causing this to be
done. They found, however, that to place the car in the highway
in its then dangerous condition was an act necessarily dangerous
to persons using the highway and the defendant was absolutely
liable, even though he did not know of the defect.
In the view of the court the case comes under the extension
of the rule of Rylands v. Fletcher as laid down by Lord Moulton
in Wing v. London General Omnibus Company. The defend6 Wing v. London General Omnibus Company. L. R. (1909) 2 K. B. 652.
According to Lord Moulton an important factor in determining the defendant's
liability in this class of cases is the economic value of the use and in this respect
cases of this nature differ from Rylands v. Fletcher where the courts refuse to
consider the economic benefit of a given use to the community. In this case
the defendants were operating an omnibus on a wet day and due to the slippery
pavement the bus skidded into the plaintiff and caused him injury. The plaintiff contended that, due to its tendency to skid, an omnibus on a wet day was to
be considered a dangerous agency and the defendant should therefore be liable
without proof of any negligence. The court said there was a certain amount
of danger connected with the operation of an omnibus on a wet day, but due to
the fact that it was an agency of public convenience and economic benefit to
the community, there ought to be a relaxation of the rule and there should be
no liability without proof of negligence.
737 T. L. R. 72 (Eng. 1920).

NOTES

ant's breach of duty was not in his failure to acquaint himself with
the imperfect condition of the car, but was in putting a twelveyear-old car on the road. It was an excessive use of the highway
and if the defendant chose to make such a use of his private rights
he must do so at his peril. On the theory, therefore, that defendant was using a vehicle inherently dangerous the court was correct
in saying that knowledge of the defect is immaterial. Since
knowledge is immaterial under the rule of Rylands v. Fletcher, it
would seem that it would likewise be immaterial under the extension of that rule, which is based on the same fundamental
theory, namely an excessive use of a private right.
It cannot be doubted that the automobile is a recognized
instrument of public convenience and economic necessity, and
ought not, therefore, to be considered as an excessive use of the
highway.6 This case does not say that the operation of an auto-mobile is an excessive use, nor ought the decision to be understood as establishing that the operation of every second-hand
or used car is attended with absolute liability. It does say, however, that the use of a very old car, whose economic benefit is not
sufficient to warrant its use in view of the added danger to other
lawful users of the highway, is excessive. It may seem that the
court went far in applying the principle of Rylands v. Fletcher
to this case. But is there any reason why a person should be
allowed to put an inherently dangerous vehicle on the highway and
greatly endanger the safety of other lawful users? It is to be remembered that the whole question is one of relative rights and it
only seems just that the person who is willing to subject other
persons to this increased danger should be liable for resulting
injury, irrespective of any negligent conduct on his part. It is
to be hoped, however, that the court will be careful in determining
whether or not an automobile is so old as to come within the operation of this rule. Obviously no hard and fast rule can be applied
and the danger is that the court may, in the exercise of its discretion, put too great a burden on the owners of used motor cars.
In those American jurisdictions which follow Rylands v. Fletcher
there is no reason why the courts should not reach the same conclusion, but on the other hand the states which reject the rule
certainly will not follow the decision.
W.H.N.
8
Wing v. Omnibus Co., supra.

